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CriminalCourt of Appeal (Criminal Division)

Attorney General’s Reference (No. 2 of 1992) [1994] QB 91

Topics:General Defences

This case summary is for law students studying the defence of automatism in criminal law. In Attorney General’s Reference (No. 2 of 1992) [1994] Q.B. 91, the Court of Appeal examined the defence’s applicability when a driver claimed to be driving without awareness. The case provides an analysis of how involuntary actions are treated under the law, making it important for understanding legal defenses.

Facts

A lorry driver struck vehicles on the motorway hard shoulder, causing two deaths. Expert evidence suggested that he had been driving without awareness, in a state involving impaired responsiveness rather than complete unconsciousness. The trial judge left non-insane automatism to the jury, which acquitted him. The Attorney General then referred the legal question to the Court of Appeal. The reference concerned whether this evidence could satisfy the requirement for automatism; it did not reopen the acquittal or ask the appellate court to convict the driver.

Legal Issue

Whether evidence of driving without awareness, involving impaired rather than completely lost voluntary control, was sufficient to leave the defence of non-insane automatism to the jury.

Held

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence did not justify leaving non-insane automatism to the jury. Lord Taylor CJ explained that the defence required a total destruction of voluntary control. The expert’s description of driving without awareness still allowed steering and a response to significant external stimuli. It therefore described reduced awareness rather than the complete involuntariness required. The court answered the Attorney General’s legal question on that basis. The reference did not set aside the driver’s acquittal. Nor did it decide that every condition causing unconsciousness is classified in the same way: the cause of a genuinely automatic state raises the separate distinction between insane and non-insane automatism.

⭐ Legal Principle

In the case of Attorney General’s Reference (No. 2 of 1992) [1994] Q.B. 91, it was held that the defence of automatism requires a total loss of control. This is not satisfied where the defendant claims to be ‘driving without awareness,’ or any other description that only indicates reduced impaired, or partial loss of control.

Significance

The reference distinguishes complete involuntariness from reduced awareness or inattention. It is especially useful where medical terminology suggests a condition but the evidence still shows retained control. A separate question is whether an established automatic state is classified as insane or non-insane automatism and whether prior fault matters. The case did not abolish those inquiries. It also did not reverse the driver’s acquittal: an Attorney General’s reference following acquittal clarifies a point of law for future cases.

Common exam questions about this case

Why did driving without awareness fail to establish automatism?

The evidence indicated that the driver retained some control, including steering and the capacity to respond to sufficiently strong stimuli. Automatism requires a total loss of voluntary control, rather than merely impaired awareness or a failure to avoid a collision. The evidential foundation for leaving that defence to the jury was therefore absent.

Does a medical description decide the legal defence?

No. The court must examine what the evidence establishes about voluntary control. A label such as driving without awareness does not answer that legal question. Even convincing evidence of reduced consciousness may fall short if the defendant retained control of relevant actions during the event in question.

Was the acquitted driver convicted through the reference?

No. An Attorney General’s reference on a point of law after acquittal does not overturn that acquittal. The court clarified that this evidence did not support an automatism direction, providing guidance for later proceedings. Keep the effect of the legal ruling separate from the original defendant’s criminal verdict.