Taylor v A Novo (UK) Ltd. [2013] E.W.C.A. Civ 194
Facts
In February 2008, C’s mother was the victim of a workplace accident when another employee caused a stack of racking boards to tip over on top of her. C’s mother suffered injuries to her left foot and her head. D, her employer, admitted negligence in causing this accident. C’s mother was apparently making a good recovery when on the 19th March 2008, she unexpectedly collapsed and died in her home. The cause of death was later shown to be the result of deep vein thrombosis and consequent pulmonary emboli. These had resulted from the injuries sustained in the accident. C did not witness the accident, but she did witness her mother’s death. As a result, she suffered significant post-traumatic stress disorder.
Legal Issue
- Was the accident or the death of her mother the appropriate event for determining whether C had sufficient proximity to be a secondary victim?
Held
The Court of Appeal rejected the daughter's claim. The workplace accident was the relevant event for the proximity inquiry. She had not witnessed that accident or its immediate aftermath, and witnessing her mother's collapse and death three weeks later did not satisfy that requirement. The later death was a consequence of the accident, not a substitute encounter with it. Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2024] UKSC 1 later explained that the accident was central to this reasoning. Paul did not treat Novo as establishing that the defendant's negligent act must itself occur immediately before the event witnessed; negligent conduct and the resulting accident may be separated in time.
⭐ Legal Principle
A claimant who witnesses a relative's later collapse, but not the causative accident or its immediate aftermath, does not establish the required proximity merely because the collapse results from the earlier injury. Paul confirms that Novo concerns proximity to the accident, not a universal limit on the time between negligence and harm.
Significance
Novo prevents a later consequence from being substituted for the accident in the secondary-victim analysis. Its comparison with McLoughlin helps identify the limits of immediate aftermath. Paul gives an essential clarification: the interval between negligent conduct and the resulting accident is not itself the objection. An unsafe structure might fail long after its negligent construction. The relevant question is the claimant's encounter with the accident, rather than how recently the defendant performed the careless act.
Common exam questions about this case
Why was witnessing the mother's death insufficient?
The daughter did not witness the workplace accident or its immediate aftermath. The collapse three weeks later was a consequence of that accident, and could not replace the encounter required for this secondary-victim claim. Her close relationship and psychiatric illness did not independently cure the missing accident proximity.
Does Novo require negligence and injury to occur at the same time?
No. Paul explains that the relevant distinction concerns the accident and what the claimant witnessed, not the interval between negligent conduct and the accident. An accident may result from much earlier negligence. The daughter failed because she witnessed a later consequence rather than the relevant accident or its immediate aftermath.
How is McLoughlin different?
McLoughlin concerned a mother's direct encounter with her family at hospital in circumstances forming the collision's immediate aftermath. Novo involved a separate collapse three weeks after the workplace accident. The difference is the relationship of the encounter to the accident, not merely whether the claimant was a close relative.