Tanner v Tanner [1975] 1 WLR 1346
Facts
The father of the defendant's children acquired a house for her and their young twins to occupy. The parents were not married and did not live there together. At his instance, the mother gave up a rent-protected flat and moved into the house to bring up the children. Their relationship later deteriorated, and he sought to recover possession after she declined an offer to leave. The dispute concerned the legal character and duration of her permission: was she merely a gratuitous licensee, or did the arrangement support an enforceable contractual right to accommodation?
Legal Issue
Whether giving up protected accommodation to occupy the father’s house with their children supported an implied contractual licence, and what duration the circumstances justified.
Held
The Court of Appeal recognised a contractual licence on the facts. The mother's surrender of her previous accommodation at the father's instance and the purpose of providing a family home supported more than a bare permission revocable immediately. Lord Denning inferred a licence to provide accommodation while the children were of school age and the house was reasonably required for them and their mother. The conclusion depended on the circumstances and the parties' arrangement, not merely the fact that she was the mother of his children. The right was contractual rather than ownership of the property; wrongful termination could therefore have contractual consequences without transferring the house to her.
⭐ Legal Principle
A contractual licence can be inferred from a domestic housing arrangement where the circumstances, including giving up protected accommodation, support a binding promise. Its terms and duration depend on the particular arrangement; it does not itself confer ownership.
Significance
Tanner is an example of a contractual licence inferred from a domestic arrangement and substantial reliance. Giving up protected accommodation helped establish that the promise of a home was more than revocable generosity. The permission remained a personal contractual right, rather than an automatic share of ownership. It should therefore be distinguished from a common-intention constructive trust or proprietary estoppel. The duration also depended on the inferred agreement and continuing housing need; it was not an unconditional right to occupy for life.
Common exam questions about this case
What supported the inference of a contractual licence?
The mother gave up her existing rent-protected flat at the father’s instance to move into a house intended as a home for her and their children. That change of position supported a binding arrangement for continuing accommodation. The court did not infer legal protection solely from the existence of a parental relationship.
Did the licence give the mother ownership of the house?
No. A contractual licence regulates permission to occupy and the obligations between the parties. It does not by itself transfer title or create a beneficial share. A claim to ownership would require its own legal basis, such as a trust, and cannot be assumed from Tanner’s conclusion about occupation.
How was the duration of the permission identified?
The court inferred an arrangement tied to accommodation reasonably required by the mother and children while the children were of school age. It did not find a simple permission terminable at a moment’s notice. The terms came from the specific circumstances, rather than a general rule that every parent may remain indefinitely.