Spencer v Wincanton Holdings Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1404

The appellant (W) appealed against a decision that it (the employer) was liable for the injuries the respondent former employee (S) had sustained in an accident he had suffered years after an accident he had suffered at work. S injured his knee during a small incident. This injury developed so far that after three years, his leg needed amputating from the knee. At this time, W did not dispute the liability in relation to the consequences of the accident, including the amputation. Eight months post amputation, S filled his car up at a petrol station without asking for help or steadying himself using sticks or his prosthesis. S tripped and caused further damage which later confined him to a wheelchair permanently. S had previously issued proceedings against W for the first accident and the damages in that claim were assessed after S had the second accident.

• The issues surrounding this case concern how far contributory negligence on behalf of S’s actions should affect a claim in negligence and whether an employer could be held liable for further injuries after admitting liability for the first.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the employer's appeal. The later fall remained sufficiently connected with the disability resulting from the original workplace injury. The claimant's decision to refuel without the available support was a misjudgment, but did not require treating his conduct as an independent cause that relieved the employer of all responsibility for the later injury. The trial judge's one-third reduction for contributory negligence reflected the claimant's share of responsibility. The case therefore distinguishes careless conduct which affects damages from conduct so unreasonable that it breaks the chain. It does not establish that an original tortfeasor pays for every future accident suffered by an injured claimant.

A claimant's careless response to a disability caused by negligence may contribute to a later accident without breaking the causal chain. In Spencer, responsibility for the further injury remained with the original defendant, subject to a one-third reduction for the claimant's contributory negligence.

Spencer is useful alongside McKew when considering a claimant's conduct after an initial injury. The question is not simply whether the claimant could have acted more carefully. It is whether the later conduct makes it appropriate to end the original defendant's legal responsibility, or instead to reflect shared responsibility through reduced damages. The continuing effect of the disability and the character of the particular misjudgment matter. Avoid treating the passage of time alone as either preserving or breaking causation.