Re Thompson [1934] Ch. 342

A testator left £1,000 to a friend to apply, in his discretion, towards promoting and furthering fox hunting. The residue of the estate was left to Trinity Hall, Cambridge. The intended recipient was willing to carry out the purpose and did not claim the legacy for his own unrestricted benefit. The executors asked the court whether the provision was valid, given its non-charitable object and the absence of an ordinary beneficiary entitled to enforce performance. The proposed arrangement therefore required examination of the narrow exceptional treatment of certain purpose gifts and the role of the residuary beneficiary if the money was misapplied.

Could a testamentary gift for promoting fox hunting be paid to a willing recipient on an undertaking to apply it for that non-charitable purpose?

Clauson J permitted payment of the legacy once the recipient gave an undertaking to apply it for the stated purpose. The gift was not charitable and the recipient was not entitled to keep the money for his own benefit. The object was sufficiently defined to be performed, and the residuary beneficiary could apply to court if the money was diverted. This was an exceptional form of enforcement associated with the narrow anomalous purpose cases, not a general validation of all non-charitable purposes. The finite amount of the legacy should not itself be treated as eliminating every duration issue. The historical decision also does not authorise activities which subsequent hunting legislation makes unlawful.

Re Thompson exceptionally permitted a willing recipient to receive a non-charitable purpose legacy on an undertaking, with the residuary beneficiary able to challenge misapplication. It is a narrow historical decision, not a general exemption from the beneficiary principle or later legislation.

The case is useful for discussing how an undertaking and a default beneficiary can provide limited control over an anomalous purpose gift. Re Endacott warns against extending such decisions. Modern use must also distinguish the historical object from activities lawful under later hunting legislation. A present trust cannot be justified simply by citing a 1934 decision involving fox hunting. The separate questions are certainty, enforceability, duration and the legality of the authorised conduct.