R v Shivpuri [1987] AC 1

Shivpuri agreed to receive and deal with packages which he believed contained prohibited drugs. He took possession and acted in furtherance of that arrangement, but examination showed that the material was harmless rather than the controlled substance he believed it to be. He was convicted of an attempt involving the prohibited importation regime and challenged the conviction because the completed offence was factually impossible. The appeal also raised the necessary knowledge of the prohibited character of the goods. The House of Lords considered the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 and its own recent decision in Anderton v Ryan.

Could handling harmless material believed to be prohibited drugs constitute an attempt, despite factual impossibility, and should Anderton v Ryan continue to govern that question?

The House of Lords dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction. The Criminal Attempts Act 1981 expressly permits an attempt where the facts make completion impossible and addresses intention by reference to the circumstances as the defendant believed them. Shivpuri's conduct had gone beyond mere preparation, and the harmless contents did not defeat liability. The House overruled Anderton v Ryan, rejecting its attempt to distinguish supposedly objectively innocent conduct in this setting. The relevant prohibited character of the goods, rather than precise identification of every substance, governed the mental element addressed in the appeal. The decision is a notable use of the 1966 Practice Statement, not its first use in criminal law.

Factual impossibility does not prevent an attempt where the defendant has the required intent and acts beyond mere preparation. Shivpuri applied the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 to harmless material believed to be prohibited drugs and overruled Anderton v Ryan's inconsistent approach.

Shivpuri separates the defendant's believed circumstances from the actual facts which prevent completion. It does not punish a thought alone: the more-than-merely-preparatory threshold remains. The case also demonstrates willingness to correct a recently decided precedent when its reasoning conflicts with the statutory scheme. Compare Pace, where impossibility did not remove the need to prove the required mental state. Believing facts which would amount to an offence is different from merely misunderstanding whether entirely lawful conduct is prohibited by law.