R v Port of London Authority, ex parte Kynoch Ltd [1919] 1 KB 176
Facts
Kynoch sought permission to construct substantial works, including a deep-water wharf, on land adjoining the Thames. The Port of London Authority had statutory responsibilities for port accommodation as well as powers to license private works. It refused the application after considering how the proposed facilities related to accommodation it was itself responsible for providing. Kynoch sought an order requiring the authority to exercise its discretion lawfully. The dispute concerned whether the authority had legitimately applied a policy connected with its functions or had closed its mind to individual applications.
Legal Issue
Whether the Port Authority unlawfully fettered its licensing discretion by adopting a general policy, or had genuinely considered Kynoch’s particular proposal within its statutory responsibilities.
Held
The Court of Appeal upheld the Port Authority's decision. The authority could adopt a general policy connected with its statutory duties, provided it remained willing to consider applications and any case for exceptional treatment. Here, the proposal had been considered on its merits and in relation to the public interest. The authority was entitled to consider the effect of the proposed accommodation on the facilities it had provided or might need to provide itself. The court therefore did not find a refusal to exercise discretion according to law. The availability of a statutory appeal was also relevant to remedy; judicial review did not turn the court into the licensing authority.
⭐ Legal Principle
A public authority may adopt a policy guiding its discretion if it remains willing genuinely to consider individual applications and exceptions. It acts unlawfully when the policy becomes a closed rule replacing the statutory discretion it must exercise.
Significance
Kynoch is a foundational authority on the distinction between a policy and unlawful fettering of discretion. An authority may organise repeated decisions through a general approach, but it must genuinely consider a case calling for an exception. The result also shows why the words of a refusal are not enough without examining what the authority actually considered. British Oxygen later develops the same practical distinction. Neither case requires an authority to grant an exception merely because an applicant asks for one.
Common exam questions about this case
Why could the Port Authority adopt a general licensing policy?
Its statutory duties included providing and managing port accommodation, so the effect of private proposals on those duties was relevant. A general policy helped organise that responsibility. The legal objection would arise if the policy replaced consideration of individual applications with a refusal to exercise the discretion Parliament had conferred.
What distinguishes policy from unlawful fettering?
The authority must remain willing to consider the particular application and a genuine case for departure. It need not abandon the policy each time someone objects. In Kynoch the proposal had been considered on its merits and in the public interest, so the refusal was not simply an unthinking application of a rule.
Did the applicant establish an entitlement to permission?
No. The court upheld the authority’s decision. Judicial review supervised the lawful exercise of discretion rather than awarding the applicant the licence it wanted. The existence of a policy was not itself unlawful, and the statutory framework also provided an appeal route relevant to the available remedy.