R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Khawaja [1984] AC 74

The joined proceedings concerned people whom immigration officials treated as illegal entrants because of alleged deception when entering the UK. Their cases included disputed accounts of marital circumstances and the information given to officials. Although permission to enter had apparently been granted, the authorities sought to use statutory detention and removal powers. The applicants challenged both the interpretation of illegal entry and the evidential basis for applying that status to them. The House of Lords had to decide whether the officer's reasonable view was enough or whether the court must itself be satisfied that the legal condition existed.

Whether illegal-entry status was an objective precedent fact for detention and removal, requiring proof before the court rather than merely a reasonable belief by immigration officials.

The House of Lords held that illegal-entry status was a precedent fact which had to be established. An officer's reasonable belief did not suffice if the evidence failed to justify the statutory condition for detention and removal. Entry procured by relevant deception could amount to illegal entry despite apparently valid permission. The court scrutinised whether that condition was proved, with the burden on the authorities and evidence appropriate to the seriousness of the allegation. The joined applicants did not all succeed: their outcomes depended on the evidence concerning their respective entry. The judgment therefore combined an interpretation of the immigration legislation with a demanding approach to proof of the fact authorising executive coercion.

Where executive power depends on an objective precedent fact, the court determines whether that fact is established rather than merely reviewing the reasonableness of official belief. Khawaja applied this principle to illegal-entry status authorising detention and removal.

Khawaja is a leading authority on jurisdictional or precedent facts. It contrasts with cases where Parliament leaves a broad evaluative judgement to an administrator: here, the legal condition for coercive immigration powers had to be established objectively. The liberty context explains the demand for close scrutiny of the evidence. Students should separate statutory interpretation, proof of deception and the burden of proving illegal entry. The case does not authorise courts to determine every disputed administrative fact afresh merely because it matters to an individual.