R v Geddes (1996) 160 JP 697; [1996] Crim LR 894

Geddes entered a school without permission and was discovered in the boys' lavatory. He left after being challenged, abandoning a bag containing items including a knife, rope and masking tape. Those objects suggested that he intended to restrain a pupil, but there was no evidence that he had confronted or tried to restrain a child. He was convicted of attempted false imprisonment. His appeal required the court to decide whether the evidence showed an act more than merely preparatory, rather than only preparation for an alarming intended offence.

Did entering the school with equipment suggesting an intended abduction amount to attempted false imprisonment when the defendant had not yet confronted or restrained a potential victim?

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction. The equipment and surrounding conduct could show what Geddes intended, but they did not establish that he had moved from preparing for false imprisonment to actually trying to commit it. The evidence was therefore insufficient in law to support the attempt charged. The court focused on the statutory requirement of an act more than merely preparatory and asked whether the defendant had begun the crime itself. The seriousness of the apparent plan did not lower that threshold. This did not amount to a finding that his conduct was harmless or that no other offence could have been committed.

Preparation and intention, however disturbing, do not establish an attempt without an act more than merely preparatory to the particular offence. Evidence showing that the defendant equipped or positioned himself to offend must be distinguished from evidence that he actually began committing it.

Geddes is often compared with Campbell and Jones because all three concern the boundary between preparation and attempt. It also demonstrates why a conviction cannot rest solely on an inference that the defendant had a serious criminal plan. A strong problem answer identifies the target offence and the acts actually performed, then explains why those acts do or do not cross the statutory threshold. Moral alarm at the circumstances cannot replace that element of liability.