R v Conway [1989] QB 290
Facts
Conway drove away dangerously when men in plain clothes approached his car. They were police officers, but he said that he believed an attack was imminent and feared for himself and his passenger. The passenger had recently been the victim of a shooting, which explained the claimed alarm. Conway relied on necessity or duress arising from the circumstances. The trial judge did not leave that defence to the jury, and Conway was convicted of reckless driving. His appeal concerned whether the evidence entitled the jury to consider the asserted emergency.
Legal Issue
Could duress of circumstances be available to a charge of reckless driving where the defendant claimed to be escaping a reasonably perceived threat of death or serious injury, and should the jury have considered it?
Held
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction. Duress of circumstances could in principle provide a defence to the reckless-driving charge, subject to the limits associated with duress. The defendant's case therefore could not be excluded merely because no person had expressly ordered him to drive in that way. On the evidence, the jury should have been directed to consider whether the circumstances justified the defence. The court did not decide that every frightened driver is excused or that Conway's account had to be accepted. The error was removing an available issue from the jury rather than assessing it under the appropriate requirements.
⭐ Legal Principle
Duress can arise from circumstances rather than an express demand to commit an offence. A properly supported emergency involving a reasonably perceived threat of death or serious injury may therefore require consideration as a defence to dangerous conduct, subject to the doctrine's limits.
Significance
The case helps distinguish duress by threats from duress of circumstances: the pressure may come from an emergency without a demand specifying the offence. That distinction does not remove the requirements of reasonable belief, proportionality and the absence of a reasonable escape. Later guidance in R v Hasan must also be considered when discussing the doctrine. An examination answer should analyse the danger perceived and the response, rather than treating the label necessity as a general permission to break the law.
Common exam questions about this case
Why was an express instruction to drive recklessly unnecessary?
The defence relied on pressure arising from the circumstances, not an order from a threatening person. The court accepted that this form of duress could apply in principle. The defendant still had to satisfy its substantive requirements, including a sufficiently serious and reasonably perceived danger.
Did allowing the appeal establish that Conway's account was true?
No. The ruling concerned whether the jury should have been permitted to consider the defence under proper directions. An appellate finding that an issue was wrongly withheld does not amount to accepting every factual assertion made by the defendant. The evidence and legal requirements remain distinct.
What prevents necessity becoming an unrestricted excuse?
The response must be assessed against a sufficiently serious threat and the limits of duress, including reasonable belief and reasonable alternatives. A mere preference for avoiding inconvenience is insufficient. Conway establishes the defence's potential availability on its facts, not an exemption whenever offending seems useful to the defendant.