McFarlane v E.E. Caledonia Ltd. [1994] 2 All E.R. 1
Facts
D owned the ‘Piper Alpha’ oil rig in the North Sea. C was a worker onboard the ‘Tharos’, a support vessel for offshore installations. On 6th July 1988, a fire broke out on the rig. After an hour the entire rig was engulfed. Various vessels went to assist in the firefighting and rescue operations, including the nearby Tharos. Ultimately, 164 men were killed and many more suffered serious injuries. While C sustained no physical injury during these operations, his experiences that night resulted in him suffering psychiatric injury.
Legal Issue
Did the claimant's position aboard a vessel assisting at the Piper Alpha disaster bring his psychiatric injury within the defendants' duty of care?
Held
The Court of Appeal rejected the psychiatric injury claim. The claimant's actual involvement in the rescue operation was limited, and the court did not accept that his position established the necessary basis for recovery. In particular, the circumstances did not justify treating psychiatric injury to a person of ordinary fortitude in his position as reasonably foreseeable. He also lacked the close relationship with victims ordinarily required where injury arises from witnessing harm to others. The decision does not mean that every person aboard a rescue vessel is automatically a secondary victim or automatically barred. The person's exposure to danger, reasonably held fears, relationship to victims and actual participation require separate examination.
⭐ Legal Principle
Presence near a disaster or aboard an assisting vessel does not itself establish a duty concerning psychiatric injury. McFarlane requires attention to the claimant's actual involvement, exposure or perceived exposure to danger, foreseeable psychiatric injury and the proximity requirements applicable to someone witnessing harm to others.
Significance
McFarlane is useful for resisting labels that bypass the duty analysis. Calling someone a rescuer or employee does not establish liability without examining what that person actually experienced. Later authority in White confirms that rescuers do not enjoy an unrestricted special route to compensation. Paul clarifies current secondary-victim doctrine, including rejecting separate objective-horror and nervous-shock requirements. Keep the historical outcome distinct from those later explanations, and do not confuse recognised psychiatric illness with proof of a duty owed to the particular claimant.
Common exam questions about this case
Why was the label rescuer insufficient?
The court examined the claimant's actual role, which involved only limited assistance, rather than accepting that presence aboard a support vessel established a special entitlement. Exposure to danger, foreseeable psychiatric injury and the relevant proximity requirements still mattered. A useful answer identifies the activities performed and the legal route relied upon.
Does a recognised psychiatric illness prove the duty element?
No. Diagnosis establishes the kind of injury alleged, but the claimant must also show that the defendant owed a duty extending to that injury in those circumstances. McFarlane failed on the relevant foreseeability and proximity analysis despite the distressing disaster and the allegation of psychiatric illness.
How should White be used alongside McFarlane?
White confirms that involvement in rescue does not automatically remove the ordinary restrictions on psychiatric injury claims. Compare the claimant's danger and actual involvement before classifying the claim. Do not reason that being an employee, attending an emergency or helping casualties is alone sufficient to establish primary-victim status.