Lumley v Wagner (1852) 1 De GM & G 604
Facts
Wagner agreed to sing at Lumley's theatre for an engagement and promised not to perform at another theatre during that period. She then arranged to sing for a rival offering better terms. Lumley sought to prevent the competing performance. He could not obtain an order requiring Wagner positively to exercise her artistic talents for him, so the proposed relief focused on the negative exclusivity promise. The court had to consider whether that promise could be protected separately and whether doing so would amount to impermissible indirect enforcement of the personal service.
Legal Issue
Could Wagner be restrained from singing at a rival theatre under her express negative covenant, although the court would not compel her to sing for Lumley?
Held
The Court of Chancery granted an injunction restraining Wagner from performing at a rival theatre during the agreed period. It would not order her positively to sing for Lumley, because that would compel personal artistic service. The express negative undertaking not to sing elsewhere was nevertheless capable of separate equitable protection on the facts. Lord St Leonards did not treat the inability to order full performance as eliminating every remedy for breach. The decision remains subject to equitable discretion and later limits concerned with indirect compulsion of personal service. A negatively worded order is not automatically acceptable merely because it avoids the phrase specific performance.
⭐ Legal Principle
An express negative covenant may support an injunction even where the corresponding positive personal-service obligation cannot be specifically enforced. Relief remains discretionary, and the court must consider whether the practical effect would impermissibly compel performance rather than merely restrain the prohibited conduct.
Significance
Lumley is the classic starting point for negative injunctions in personal-service contracts. Its significance lies in the distinction between compelling a performance and restraining an agreed competitive activity, not a general right to prevent a worker earning a livelihood. Later cases refine the practical limits of that distinction. In an exam, identify the covenant, duration and scope of the proposed order, consider adequacy of damages and examine whether the order effectively forces the promised personal service.
Common exam questions about this case
Why would the court not order Wagner to sing?
That would require direct performance of a personal artistic service. The court instead considered whether the separate promise not to sing elsewhere could be protected. Inability to compel the positive performance did not automatically decide whether a narrower negative restraint was appropriate.
Why was a negative injunction available on these facts?
Wagner had expressly agreed not to perform elsewhere during the relevant engagement. The court treated that undertaking as capable of protection without directing her to appear at Lumley's theatre. The result depended on the covenant and circumstances, not simply the claimant's preference for an injunction.
Can any personal-service promise be enforced by drafting relief negatively?
No. Courts examine practical effect as well as wording. A restraint that effectively compels the personal performance or leaves impermissibly coercive consequences may be refused. Lumley supplies the starting distinction, while later authority and equitable discretion prevent it becoming a drafting device to evade those limits.