King v Dubrey [2015] EWCA Civ 581

An aunt owned a house and had made a valid will leaving most of her estate to charities. Her nephew later claimed that she had handed him the title deeds and said that the house would be his when she died. Other informal notes and a purported later will did not satisfy ordinary testamentary formalities. After her death, he asserted that the house had nevertheless passed through donatio mortis causa. The dispute required the Court of Appeal to distinguish an exceptional conditional gift from an unenforceable informal expression of what the aunt wished to happen on death.

Was there a donatio mortis causa, under which the home would be the C’s? What are the requirements for this exception to the valid lifetime gifts and dispositions?

The Court of Appeal rejected the nephew’s claim and overturned the finding of a valid donatio mortis causa. Jackson LJ required contemplation of impending death for a specific reason, a gift conditional upon that death and delivery of dominion. The aunt’s age and statements about what would happen when she died did not establish the first two requirements. Even if delivery of the unregistered title deeds could satisfy the dominion requirement, it could not cure the other defects. The court warned against extending this exceptional doctrine in a way that undermined statutory formalities and invited abuse. The property therefore did not pass to the nephew through the alleged conditional gift.

Donatio mortis causa requires contemplation of impending death for a specific reason, a gift conditional on that death and delivery of dominion. King v Dubrey requires those elements strictly; delivery of title documents alone does not validate an informal testamentary intention.

King v Dubrey confines donatio mortis causa to its exceptional role and warns against using it to evade ordinary will formalities. Anticipation of eventual death through age is not enough; the donor must contemplate impending death for a specific reason. Delivery of deeds may address dominion but cannot replace the other requirements. The case is especially useful for distinguishing a conditional deathbed gift from an informal expression of testamentary intention. The nephew’s claim failed despite his account of receiving the title deeds.