Jaggard v Dickinson [1981] QB 527
Facts
Dickinson, who had been drinking, went to a house believing it belonged to a friend who would allow her to enter. The house was not her friend's, and she damaged property while trying to gain entry. Charged with criminal damage, she relied on an honest belief that the owner would have consented. Her mistake was connected with her intoxication. The appeal concerned the particular lawful-excuse provisions of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, rather than a general proposition that drinking excuses damage to another person's property.
Legal Issue
Could an honestly held belief in the owner's consent constitute lawful excuse under the Criminal Damage Act 1971 when that belief resulted from voluntary intoxication and was unreasonable?
Held
The Divisional Court allowed the appeal. Section 5 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 directs attention to an honest belief that the person entitled to consent had consented, or would have consented if aware of the relevant circumstances. The statute also makes the reasonableness of that belief immaterial to this particular excuse. A belief did not cease to qualify merely because intoxication explained the mistake. The court therefore treated the statutory language as decisive. This was not a general defence of drunkenness and did not remove the requirement to establish that the claimed belief in consent was actually held by the defendant.
⭐ Legal Principle
For the consent-based lawful excuse in section 5(2)(a) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, an honest belief can qualify even if induced by intoxication. Section 5(3) makes honesty, rather than the reasonableness of that particular belief, the relevant statutory requirement.
Significance
The case shows why a specific statutory defence must be analysed before applying broad slogans about intoxication. It can be contrasted with restrictions on relying on a drunken mistake in other defences, but the different legal wording matters. In a problem question, identify the precise belief asserted, the person believed to have authority to consent, and whether the belief was honestly held. Do not extend the result to every offence involving property or every mistake caused by alcohol.
Common exam questions about this case
Was intoxication itself the lawful excuse?
No. The excuse was an honest belief in the relevant person's consent under the Criminal Damage Act 1971. Intoxication mattered because it explained the mistake, but the statute did not disqualify that belief on this ground. The defendant still needed to rely on the specific consent-based excuse.
Does an unreasonable belief necessarily fail under section 5?
Not for the belief addressed in section 5(2)(a), because section 5(3) focuses on honesty rather than justifiability. Unreasonableness may nevertheless help a fact-finder decide whether the asserted belief was genuine. It should not be silently converted into an additional legal requirement that the belief be reasonable.
Why should this case not be used as a universal intoxication rule?
Its result depends on the wording of a particular statutory excuse for criminal damage. Other offences and defences may use different requirements or restrict drunken mistakes. An examination answer should identify those provisions separately instead of assuming that every honestly asserted mistake has the same legal effect.