Green v Ashco Horticultural Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 889
Facts
A shop tenant used a passage and courtyard across the landlord’s adjoining premises to reach the rear of his shop. The access was controlled by gates and interrupted when the landlord needed the area for its own business. The lease was renewed, after which the reversion was sold to the defendant. The tenant claimed that section 62 had converted the earlier access arrangement into an easement. The defendant relied both on the lease wording and the limited, conditional nature of the permission previously enjoyed. The court examined what, if anything, was capable of passing with the renewal.
Legal Issue
Did section 62 convert the tenant’s conditional access permission into an easement on renewal, despite the landlord’s control and interruption of the passage for its own purposes?
Held
Cross J rejected the easement claim. The lease clause relied on by the defendant concerned light and air and was not a general exclusion disposing of this access question. Nevertheless, the earlier permission was so dependent on the landlord’s business needs and interruptions that it lacked the character of a grantable legal easement. Section 62 could not convert that limited arrangement into the unrestricted right asserted. The decision therefore depended on the actual permission and its limits, rather than the proposition that all permissive use is incapable of passing under section 62. The tenant could not claim a broader entitlement than the privilege supported.
⭐ Legal Principle
Section 62 does not transform every temporary or conditional permission into an easement. The previous privilege must be examined for its scope and legal character, and the resulting right cannot simply disregard restrictions essential to that arrangement.
Significance
Green supplies a limit to the familiar proposition that section 62 may elevate permissions into easements. The nature of the permission matters, not simply its existence before renewal. Compare Goldberg and Wood v Waddington without assuming identical facts. The lease’s purported exclusion must also be construed carefully: here the claim failed on the character of the use despite the particular light-and-air clause not determining the access dispute.
Common exam questions about this case
Did the lease exclude every possible easement?
No. The court construed the relevant reservation as directed to light and air. That did not automatically determine the right-of-way claim. The claim nevertheless failed because of the limited and conditional nature of the previous access arrangement, showing why the grounds must be analysed separately.
Why did interruptions by the landlord matter?
They showed that access depended on the landlord’s own use and priorities rather than an established entitlement of the scope claimed. The tenant could not invoke section 62 to remove those essential limits. The legal character of the previous privilege was central to the result.
Does Green say licences can never become easements under section 62?
No. That would contradict the need to examine the actual privilege and the statutory conditions. Green concerns a particular conditional arrangement which could not support the asserted legal right. A different, sufficiently defined permission may require a different analysis on a later conveyance.