Greasley v Cooke [1980] 1 WLR 1306

D worked as a maid and went on to live with a member of the household at which she worked. Their relationship was akin to that of a husband and wife. When they were in the relationship with the member of the household, she was not paid for her work, but continued to look after the family there. She was told that she could live in the house for life. Her partner inherited the property, and his sons sought to evict her. D relied on property estoppel, and argued that she could not be evicted because she was entitled to live in the property for the rest of her life. the trial judge found in favour of Cs, on the basis that D had to prove she relied on the assurance made to her by the family, and that she relied on this assurance to her detriment.

The issue in this case was whether D had to prove that there was detrimental reliance, or whether it was for the Cs to prove that she did not rely to her detriment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the occupier’s proprietary-estoppel defence. She had remained in the household providing substantial unpaid care after assurances that she could stay for life. In those circumstances reliance could be inferred, and those denying the assurance’s effect had not displaced that inference. Her continued service and lost opportunity to obtain paid work elsewhere provided the relevant detriment. The decision should not be restated as removing detrimental reliance from proprietary estoppel. Nor does it mean that defendants always bear the legal burden simply because an occupier makes an assertion. The evidential inference arose from the assurance and the conduct established in this particular relationship.

Where an assurance is followed by conduct naturally explicable as reliance, reliance may be inferred unless rebutted. Continuing unpaid care and giving up alternative work can constitute detriment. Greasley does not dispense with the need for detrimental reliance in proprietary estoppel.

Greasley concerns proof of reliance, not elimination of that essential element. It is useful where a long domestic relationship makes direct evidence of each individual decision unrealistic. Once the relevant assurance and conduct are established, an inference may be available, subject to contrary evidence. That does not transfer every evidential burden to the landowner. Gillett and Guest reinforce the need to assess the nature of the assurance, the claimant’s choices and the detriment in the setting of the relationship.