Graham-York v York [2016] 1 FLR 407

After Norton York died, mortgage arrears led the lender to seek possession of the house where he and Miss Graham-York had lived. They had been partners from 1976 until his death in 2009 and had occupied this house together from 1985. Title was in his name alone. In the possession proceedings, she claimed a beneficial interest arising from their shared life and her contributions. The trial judge accepted that she owned a share and assessed it at 25%, payable from the proceeds remaining after the mortgage was discharged. She appealed, seeking a half share and disputing the treatment of the mortgage. The appeal concerned the size and priority of her interest, rather than whether she had any interest at all.

Could G claim a 50% share without her name on the legal title of the property and without contributing to the purchase price.

The Court of Appeal upheld the claimant’s 25 per cent beneficial share. In a sole-name case, the starting point is not a presumption that a cohabiting couple own equally. Having established an interest, its extent had to be assessed on the relevant evidence of their whole course of dealings. The trial judge had considered the claimant’s contributions and the relationship and had reached an evaluation within the permissible range. An appellate court could not replace that figure merely because it might also have accepted a somewhat higher one. The length of cohabitation and domestic contribution therefore mattered without automatically producing an equal division.

Sole-name cohabitation cases do not begin with a presumption of equal beneficial shares. Once an interest is established, its extent requires an evidence-based assessment; an appellate court will not substitute a preferred percentage without a sufficient error in the trial evaluation.

Graham-York helps distinguish joint-name presumptions from sole-name claims. It also warns against treating long cohabitation as an automatic entitlement to half the home. The question of establishing an interest must remain separate from quantifying it. The decision does not make domestic contributions legally irrelevant, but it rejects a numerical rule detached from the parties’ ownership arrangements and accepted financial history.