Gore v Van der Lann [1967] 2 QB 31
Facts
A passenger travelled on a free old-age pensioner's bus pass issued by Liverpool Corporation and was injured during the journey. She sued a conductor in negligence. The corporation sought to stay the proceedings, relying on a pass condition intended to protect its servants from liability and arguing that the action affected its own interests. The dispute concerned whether the passenger had validly promised not to sue the employee and whether the corporation could enforce that protection. Statutory restrictions on agreements excluding liability for passenger injuries were also relevant.
Legal Issue
Could the corporation restrain the passenger’s negligence action against its conductor through the pass condition despite the absence of a valid covenant not to sue?
Held
The Court of Appeal rejected the corporation's attempt to stay the passenger's negligence action against the conductor. The corporation could not establish a contractual promise by the passenger not to sue its employee, and the mere prospect of financial or practical concern did not supply the standing needed for the relief sought.
The court also considered the statutory restriction on excluding passenger injury liability under the Road Traffic Act 1960. An implied covenant not to sue, even if otherwise arguable, could not evade that protection. The case therefore involved both the basis on which a contracting party could restrain proceedings benefiting an employee and the independent statutory limit. It should not be presented simply as a finding that all contractual protection of employees is impossible.
⭐ Legal Principle
A contracting party seeking to restrain proceedings against its employee must establish an enforceable basis and its own standing for that relief. A condition benefiting the employee does not automatically imply a covenant not to sue. Statutory restrictions on excluding liability must also be respected.
Significance
Gore illustrates the limits of using a contracting party to secure protection for a third-party employee. It is useful alongside privity authorities because the precise promise and basis of standing matter, not merely the employer's wish to protect its workforce. The passenger-protection statute supplied a further obstacle. Modern problems require attention to applicable road-traffic and consumer legislation and, where relevant, the 1999 Act; the historical case does not resolve every contemporary employee-benefit clause.
Common exam questions about this case
Why could the corporation not simply stop the claim against its conductor?
It had to establish its own enforceable basis for restraining the passenger, such as a valid covenant not to sue or another recognised interest. The relevant promise was not established. An employer's general concern about proceedings against staff does not itself confer the necessary contractual right or standing.
Why was the road-traffic legislation independently important?
A supposed agreement restricting the passenger's right to claim for injury could not evade the statutory protection. Even if a contractual promise had been inferred, validity would still require analysis under the applicable legislation. The case therefore cannot be explained only by identifying the parties to the contract.
Does Gore mean third-party employees can never receive contractual protection?
No. Other doctrines or statutory third-party rights may support protection where their requirements are met. Gore concerned the particular condition, absence of the necessary covenant and relevant passenger statute. A modern problem requires construction of the actual provision and identification of the proposed enforcement route.