Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645

Lightning struck a large tree on the occupier's land and started a fire. He arranged for the tree to be felled, but allowed it to continue burning rather than using available water to extinguish it. Later, stronger wind revived and spread the fire onto neighbouring property, causing damage. The neighbours claimed that the occupier should have taken further precautions once he knew of the danger. The Privy Council considered his responsibility for responding to a naturally started fire and whether the law required reasonable measures despite his having played no part in its original ignition.

Did the occupier have to take reasonable steps to extinguish a naturally started fire once he knew it threatened neighbouring property?

The Privy Council upheld liability for the failure to take reasonable precautions after the danger became known. The occupier had not caused the lightning strike, but that did not answer the claim concerning his subsequent response. Felling the tree without extinguishing the remaining fire was insufficient when water and practical means of dealing with it were available. The obligation was measured by what could reasonably be expected in the circumstances, including the occupier's capacities and resources. It was not an absolute duty to prevent every natural event. The statutory protection concerning accidental fires did not excuse the negligent failure to deal with the known continuing danger.

An occupier who knows of a naturally arising danger on land may have to take reasonable steps to prevent its spread to neighbours. The obligation is measured by the circumstances, including the occupier's resources and ability to act, rather than imposing absolute responsibility for natural events.

Goldman extends attention from creating a hazard to dealing reasonably with one which nature has produced. Lightning started the fire, but the occupier's response could still found liability. Its measured-duty approach influenced Leakey in English law, especially the relevance of practical capacity to abate a danger. The decision does not make landowners insurers against every storm, fire or landslip, and accidental origin does not necessarily excuse later negligent inaction.