Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services [2003] 1 AC 32
Facts
Workers developed mesothelioma after wrongful asbestos exposure during employment with different employers. Medical science could not identify which particular exposure had initiated the disease. Each employer could therefore argue that ordinary proof had not shown its own exposure was the cause. The employees or their representatives sought compensation despite that evidential obstacle. The appeals required the House of Lords to decide whether, in this specific setting, materially increasing the risk through wrongful exposure could establish the necessary causal connection. The disease was mesothelioma, not an undifferentiated claim for all forms of lung cancer.
Legal Issue
- Which (if any) of the employers were the claimants entitled to sue for compensation for negligence in exposing employees to asbestos and causing harm?
Held
The House of Lords allowed the appeals and recognised an exceptional route to establishing causation. Where the relevant conditions were met, an employer's wrongful exposure which materially increased the risk of mesothelioma was sufficient. The scientific inability to identify the causative exposure did not require every claim to fail. This did not establish that each exposure had medically caused the disease, nor did it replace ordinary causation rules across negligence. The decision addressed the particular evidential problem associated with the disease and the risk against which the employers' duty protected. Questions concerning apportionment and recovery were subsequently affected by Barker and the Compensation Act 2006.
⭐ Legal Principle
In the exceptional mesothelioma setting, wrongful asbestos exposure materially increasing the risk may satisfy the causal requirement despite inability to identify which exposure caused the disease. This is a legal exception to ordinary causal proof, not proof that each exposure actually caused the injury.
Significance
Fairchild is central to understanding the distinction between material contribution to injury and material increase in risk. Barker later adopted proportionate liability, but section 3 of the Compensation Act 2006 provides whole-damage and joint-and-several liability for qualifying mesothelioma claims. Those developments must be separated from the original causal holding. The exception should not be extended to an unrelated disease or ordinary medical uncertainty without authority establishing that the relevant conditions are met.
Common exam questions about this case
Did Fairchild prove which employer caused the disease?
No. The problem was precisely that medical science could not identify the causative exposure. The court treated material increase in the relevant risk through wrongful exposure as sufficient legal causation in this exceptional setting. Describing every employer as a medically established cause would misstate the reasoning.
Why is Bailey a different causal approach?
Bailey concerns cumulative causes contributing to the claimant's actual weakness and resulting injury. Fairchild addresses exceptional uncertainty about which exposure caused mesothelioma through a material-increase-in-risk rule. Identifying whether the evidence shows actual contribution or only increased risk is essential before choosing between these doctrines.
How is liability for qualifying mesothelioma apportioned today?
Section 3 of the Compensation Act 2006 makes a responsible person liable for the whole damage, jointly and severally with other responsible persons where applicable. Contribution between defendants remains possible. The statute should therefore be considered alongside Fairchild and Barker rather than assuming the 2002 judgment alone answers current recovery questions.