Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tr 1029

Government messengers, including Nathan Carrington, entered John Entick’s home under a warrant issued by the Secretary of State, the Earl of Halifax. They searched the premises and seized private papers while investigating allegedly seditious writings. Entick sued the messengers in trespass, contending that the warrant did not legally authorise their conduct. The defendants relied on the minister’s direction and the asserted practice of issuing such warrants. The case required them to establish a lawful power to carry out this interference with Entick’s home, papers and property.

Did the Secretary of State’s warrant provide lawful authority for the messengers to enter Entick’s home, search his papers and seize them, defeating his trespass claim?

The Court of Common Pleas found for Entick. The defendants could not establish a lawful power authorising the warrant and the consequent interference with his property. Executive convenience and previous governmental practice did not by themselves justify the search. Lord Camden required the asserted authority to be found in the law rather than created by ministerial assertion. The judgment did not require all lawful powers to arise from statute: recognised common law authority could also be relevant, but the claimed power was not established. The messengers were consequently liable in trespass. The case made the limits of public authority practically enforceable through an ordinary claim concerning property rights.

State officials must identify lawful authority for interference with private property and rights. A ministerial warrant or governmental practice does not itself create that authority. Entick’s search and seizure were unlawful because the asserted power had no established legal basis.

Entick is a foundation for the principle that public officials need legal authority to interfere with private rights. A warrant's governmental origin did not itself supply that authority. The lawful basis may be statute or recognised common law; the important question is whether the power actually exists and covers the interference. The case also links constitutional accountability to an ordinary action in trespass. It should not be presented as a decision that every search is unlawful, since properly authorised searches require analysis of their own legal conditions.