Eastwood v Kenyon (1840) 11 Ad & E 438
Facts
Eastwood took responsibility for a young woman's upbringing and property affairs and borrowed money to fund expenditure for her benefit. After she married Kenyon, Kenyon promised to reimburse the outstanding amount. The promised payment was not made, and Eastwood sued on the assurance. The expenditure had already occurred and was not alleged to have been requested by Kenyon as part of an exchange for his promise. The dispute therefore concerned whether a later acknowledgment of a beneficial act or moral responsibility could support an enforceable contractual undertaking.
Legal Issue
Did the earlier expenditure constitute consideration for Kenyon’s later promise, or was the assurance merely a promise to reimburse a voluntary past benefit?
Held
The court held that Kenyon's promise was unsupported by consideration. Eastwood's expenditure had already been incurred before the promise and was not alleged to have been undertaken at Kenyon's request as part of a bargain. A moral obligation to reimburse the expenditure did not itself supply the missing legal exchange.
The fact that the expenditure had benefited the woman and, indirectly, her husband did not convert the later assurance into a contract. The decision therefore distinguishes compensation promised for a requested service from a voluntary promise made after a benefit has already been conferred. It should not be read as excluding every later express promise connected with an earlier requested service, which may fall within a different analysis.
⭐ Legal Principle
A later promise to reward a voluntarily conferred benefit is generally unsupported by consideration where the act was not requested as part of the bargain. Moral obligation alone is insufficient. An earlier requested act undertaken on an understood basis of remuneration requires separate consideration.
Significance
Eastwood is a standard illustration of past consideration and the difference between moral and contractual obligation. The crucial point is the lack of a requested exchange, not simply that the benefit was valuable or well intentioned. Compare Lampleigh, where a requested service and an understood expectation of reward explain why a later promise can be connected to the original transaction. Students should therefore establish who requested the act and on what basis before treating its timing as conclusive.
Common exam questions about this case
Why did Eastwood’s expenditure not support Kenyon’s later promise?
The expenditure preceded the promise and was not undertaken at Kenyon's request as part of an exchange. It was therefore a benefit already conferred, rather than the price of his undertaking. The value of the education or support did not by itself create the missing contractual bargain.
Could a moral duty to reimburse supply consideration?
No. The court did not treat a sense of responsibility for benefits received as equivalent to a bargained-for legal obligation. A person can make a morally significant assurance without creating an enforceable simple contract. Another recognised basis of liability would need to be established on its own requirements.
How should Lampleigh be distinguished?
Lampleigh concerns an earlier act requested in circumstances carrying an understood expectation of payment. A later promise can clarify that original remunerated arrangement. Eastwood involved voluntary expenditure not requested by the later promisor in that way, so the two cases should not be reduced to an absolute rule about chronological sequence.