Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 10

The ministry of justice appealed against a decision that it was vicariously liable for injury caused to the respondent by the negligence act of a prisoner undertaking paid kitchen work. The respondent (C) was a catering manager at prison. Prisons by law are required to ensure that prisoners did useful work. The prisoner responsible for the injury had earned a nominal wage. The Court of Appeal applied the criteria listed in Various Claimants v Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools [2012] UKSC 56 [2013] 2 A.C.1,[2012] 11 WLUK 630, for imposing vicarious liability where the relationship was not one of employment and held that the prison service was vicariously liable. The ministry argued that the relationship was different from an employer/employee relationship as the prison was not for profit.

Could the prison service be vicariously liable for a prisoner's negligent kitchen work despite the absence of a conventional employment contract or profit-making enterprise?

The Supreme Court dismissed the Ministry's appeal. The prisoner's work formed an integral part of the prison's operations and was performed for its benefit, under arrangements creating the risk of the catering manager's injury. A conventional employment contract was unnecessary for the relationship to attract vicarious liability. The fact that the prison service was not run for profit also did not exclude responsibility. Lord Reed applied the principles developed in the Christian Brothers case, focusing on the substance of the relationship rather than its label. The decision did not make the prison responsible for every act of every prisoner; the relevant relationship and connection with the assigned work still mattered.

Vicarious liability can arise from a relationship akin to employment where the wrongdoer's activities form an integral part of the defendant's operations and create the relevant risk. Cox applied that approach to prison kitchen work despite the absence of an ordinary employment contract or profit-making business.

Cox develops the first stage of vicarious liability: identifying a relationship capable of supporting responsibility for another person's tort. The prisoner's work formed part of the prison's operations, and compulsory work for nominal pay did not place it outside the principle. Later cases distinguish genuinely independent businesses from relationships akin to employment. The second stage, connecting the particular wrong to the assigned activity, remains necessary and should not disappear from the analysis.