[C]areerInLaw.net
CriminalCourt of Appeal (Criminal Division)

R v Cheshire [1991] 1 WLR 844

Topics:Actus Reus & Causation

Facts

  • On December 9, 1987, the defendant (/appellant) (D), David Cheshire, shot (the deceased) Trevor Jeffery, the victim (V) twice, once in the stomach and again in the thigh. The victim was subsequently taken to the hospital where medical care was administered, doctors inserted a tracheostomy tube for 4 weeks into the victim to help resolve the respiratory issues Mr. Jeffery was facing.
  • Unfortunately, Mr. Jeffery’s condition worsened, and he died on the 15th of February. It was later discovered that Mr. Jeffery’s windpipe had become so narrowed at the site of the tracheostomy scar, so much so that a small amount of mucus could have blocked it and caused asphyxiation.
  • Mr. Cheshire was charged with murder, convicted, and later appealed to this decision on the grounds that the jury was misdirected.

Legal Issue

Did negligent treatment of complications following the shooting break the chain of causation between Cheshire's attack and the victim's death?

Held

The Court of Appeal dismissed Cheshire's appeal. His conduct did not have to be the sole or principal cause of death, provided it made a significant contribution. Medical treatment would break the chain only if it was sufficiently independent of the original conduct and so potent in causing death that the defendant's contribution became insignificant.

The victim required treatment because of the shooting, and the complications associated with that treatment did not meet the demanding test for a new intervening cause. A departure from competent medical practice was not enough by itself. The court therefore rejected the argument that the original wounds' improvement necessarily removed the shooting from the legally operative causes of death.

⭐ Legal Principle

Negligent medical treatment does not ordinarily break the chain of causation following an attack. It must be so independent and potent that the defendant's contribution becomes insignificant. The original act need not remain the sole or main cause, but must remain a significant cause of death.

Significance

Cheshire supplies a demanding test for intervening medical treatment in criminal causation. It helps distinguish factual sequences from the legal significance of the defendant's contribution. Students should not ask merely whether a doctor made a mistake or whether the original wound was healing. The relationship between the treatment and the attack, and the relative causal significance of each, must be examined before deciding that responsibility has shifted entirely.

Common exam questions about this case

Why did the medical complication not necessarily break causation?

The treatment was required because of the shooting, and negligence in that treatment did not automatically displace the attack as a significant cause. The court required an independent and sufficiently potent intervention making Cheshire's contribution insignificant. That demanding threshold was not met merely by showing that treatment had gone wrong.

Must the defendant's act be the main cause of death?

No. Cheshire states that a significant contribution can suffice even if another factor is more immediate or powerful. A student should therefore identify whether the attack remained causally significant, rather than assume that the last event before death or the largest medical error must be its only legal cause.

Is professional negligence alone the test for a new intervening cause?

No. A finding that treatment fell below professional standards answers a different question. The criminal causation enquiry concerns independence and causal potency relative to the original attack. Even serious criticism of the treatment does not remove the need to apply that test to the actual chain of events.