• In the case of Cheshire 1991 3 all er 670 Crim I r 709, the legal principle afoot concerned the chain of causation, and what is required for an act of a third party to break the chain of causation.
  • An act of a third party must be sufficiently independent and potent that it renders the original cause insufficient, the level of fault of the third party is irrelevant so long as it achieves the latter it will break the chain of causation.

Facts of the Case

  • On December 9, 1987, the defendant (/appellant) (D), David Cheshire, shot (the deceased) Trevor Jeffery, the victim (V) twice, once in the stomach and again in the thigh. The victim was subsequently taken to the hospital where medical care was administered, doctors inserted a tracheostomy tube for 4 weeks into the victim to help resolve the respiratory issues Mr. Jeffery was facing.
  • Unfortunately, Mr. Jeffery’s condition worsened, and he died on the 15th of February. It was later discovered that Mr. Jeffery’s windpipe had become so narrowed at the site of the tracheostomy scar, so much so that a small amount of mucus could have blocked it and caused asphyxiation.
  • Mr. Cheshire was charged with murder, convicted, and later appealed to this decision on the grounds that the jury was misdirected.

Issues in Cheshire 1991 3 all er 670 Crim I r 709

  • The issue here was whether the actions of Mr. Cheshire were the operating and substantial cause of the victim, Mr. Jeffery’s death or;
  • If the negligent treatment received by Mr. Jeffery at the hospital was independent and so potent in causing his death that it broke the chain of causation making the contribution made by Mr. Cheshire’s acts insignificant.

Held by the Court of Appeal

  • Mr. Cheshire’s appeal was dismissed and the conviction was upheld despite the fact the wounds caused by him were not the operative cause of death.
  • It had been declared by the court and its judges that no break in the chain of causation had occurred.

Lord Justice Beldam

  • In order for the defendant to be responsible, his acts need not be the sole cause or even the main cause of death, it is sufficient that his acts contributed significantly to that result.
  • However, the defendant’s link in the chain of causation is excluded only when the negligent treatment is so independent of his own actions and in itself so potent in causing death that the appropriate authorities can regard his contributions to the result as insignificant.
  • Falling below the standard of a competent doctor is not enough, acts of the doctor must be extraordinary to be considered independent of the conduct of the defendant.