Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather [1994] 2 A.C. 264

In 1976, C purchased property containing a borehole. C extracted water from here for domestic purposes, supplying about 275,000 people. In 1976, water was not typically tested for the presence of P.C.E. (a chlorinated solvent). P.C.E. testing was introduced in later years. Since 1879, D owned a tannery located 1.3 miles away from C’s borehole. Until 1991, D used chlorine compounds as degreasing solvents. Until about 1973, T.C.E. was D’s preferred solvent. After this time, P.C.E. became used with increasing frequency. During the process of replacing the P.C.E. supply, small quantities were split on the floor. C detected the presence of P.C.E. in the soil around the borehole. After testing, C found that P.C.E. concentration was many times higher than natural. C was forced to halt all operations involving this borehole.

• Was D liable under negligence, nuisance, or Ryland v Fletcher (liable for consequences of storing a non-natural substance on their land and its ensuing escape)?
• Was the type of damage caused reasonably foreseeable by D, and if so, did it allow D to avoid liability?

Finding for D, that it was not reasonably foreseeable to D that a P.C.E. spillage could contaminate a borehole so far away. The need to show foreseeability of harm of the relevant type by D could not be neglected. Even though storage of P.C.E constituted a non-natural use of D’s land, since C could not establish that the pollution which occurred was in the circumstances foreseeable, D could not be held liable under Ryland v Fletcher. The judge at first instance found that a reasonable supervisor would not have foreseen that such repeated spillages in small quantities would create an environmental hazard or damage. The reasonable assumption would be that any spillage would evaporate rapidly in the air. Environmental protection is now considered crucial to mankind’s future. However, this does not justify extending strict liability in the common law regarding such pollution. With legislation being implemented for this purpose, it is unnecessary and potentially undesirable to develop a principle achieving the same end.

Liability under Rylands v Fletcher requires reasonable foreseeability of damage of the relevant type. Strict liability does not remove remoteness limits. Cambridge Water rejected recovery for groundwater contamination where that kind of harm was not reasonably foreseeable when the spillages occurred.

Cambridge Water connects Rylands liability with the remoteness principles applicable in nuisance. It is especially useful because the court could regard substantial chemical storage as a non-natural use yet still reject liability for unforeseeable damage. Those are separate requirements. Transco later clarified the exceptional nature of the Rylands rule. Environmental seriousness alone does not permit a court to omit the elements of the cause of action or replace the applicable statutory framework.