Barnes v Scout Association [2010] EWCA Civ 1476

C was a member of the boy scouts, a group maintained by D. During one meeting, a game was organised by an agent of D, which required participants to run across an enclosed room at high speeds. The room was poorly lit as the participants ran, as the room’s main lights were switched off. C fell and collided with a bench whilst playing this game, in an attempt to slow down before hitting a wall he had not seen in time. Through this, he injured his head and shoulder. Such a degree of risk was held to amount to a breach of a duty to take reasonable care owed by D to C and so D was held liable for negligence. D also contended that the judge had failed to properly take the social benefits of the activity into account.

• Did playing a potentially risky game in the dark significantly elevate the risks of injury to an unacceptable level?
• To what extent should the social benefit of an activity impact the level of risk deemed acceptable when one party owes a duty of care to the other?

The Court of Appeal majority dismissed the Scout Association's appeal. Playing the running game in reduced lighting introduced an additional risk of collision, and the trial judge was entitled to find that risk unreasonable. The social value of scouting and organised recreation was relevant, but did not decide whether this particular variation was justified. The majority distinguished the benefits of the activity from the excitement added by switching off the lights. Jackson LJ dissented over the balance of risk and benefit. The decision therefore illustrates an evaluative breach-of-duty assessment, not a rule that children's games must eliminate every possibility of injury.

Assessing breach requires balancing the risk created by the particular activity against its benefits and the precautions reasonably available. The social value of an organisation does not by itself justify every avoidable risk introduced into one of its activities.

Barnes provides a practical example of disagreement about reasonable recreational risk. The crucial choice was not whether children should be allowed to play games, but whether reduced lighting added a justified risk. It is useful alongside Tomlinson when discussing personal responsibility and the social value of recreation, while recognising that an adult's voluntary activity and an organiser's supervision of children involve different facts. The dissent should not be confused with the majority's conclusion.