Attorney General's Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] Q.B. 715
Law students studying criminal law should pay attention to Attorney General’s Reference (No. 6 of 1980). This case examines the use of consent as a defence in cases of assault causing bodily harm, and its outcome significantly alters the understanding of consent in violent situations. It is a crucial study point for those interested in the boundaries of lawful and unlawful actions.
Facts
Two young men argued in a public street and agreed to settle their dispute by fighting. They prepared for the fight and exchanged punches. One sustained a bleeding nose and facial bruising. The other was prosecuted for assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The trial judge directed the jury that consent to the fight could make the conduct lawful, and the defendant was acquitted. The Attorney General referred the legal issue to the Court of Appeal to clarify the effect of consent to deliberately inflicted bodily harm.
Legal Issue
Does agreement to a fist fight provide a defence to assault occasioning actual bodily harm where no recognised exception justifies the violence?
Held
The Court of Appeal held that consent did not provide a defence to the deliberate fight on these facts. The public interest did not permit people to cause or attempt to cause one another actual bodily harm merely because they agreed to do so. The legal direction at trial was therefore wrong.
The court recognised that activities such as properly conducted sport can fall within accepted exceptions. It also made clear that the distinction did not turn simply on whether the violence occurred in public or in private. The reference supplied guidance on the law after acquittal; it did not treat the Court or the Attorney General as a victim winning damages.
⭐ Legal Principle
Consent generally does not excuse the intentional or reckless infliction of actual bodily harm without a recognised justification or exception. An agreed fight is not made lawful merely by mutual consent, and moving it into private does not by itself change the rule.
Significance
The reference identifies the public-interest limits on consent to injury and provides a starting point for later cases such as Brown and Wilson. It is especially useful for avoiding the false assumption that agreement makes every physical encounter lawful. The recognised activity and the nature of the harm matter. Students should distinguish ordinary consent to touching, consent within regulated activities and agreement to an otherwise unjustified fight.
Common exam questions about this case
Why did consent fail to justify the fight?
The participants deliberately exchanged violence causing actual bodily harm without a recognised justification. The court considered that agreement alone did not make such harm lawful. This differs from ordinary consensual touching and from activities such as properly conducted sport, where the law recognises a distinct justification or exception.
Would holding the same fight in private necessarily change the result?
No. The court expressly rejected a simple public-versus-private distinction. The relevant issue was consent to the bodily harm and whether the activity had a recognised justification. Privacy alone does not transform an agreed fight into lawful conduct when the same unjustified injury is inflicted.
How should an answer deal with exceptions such as sport?
It should identify the particular activity and the legal basis on which consent can operate within it. The existence of exceptions does not mean every agreed violent encounter qualifies. Equally, the general restriction should not be stated as a ban on all consensual conduct capable of causing bodily injury.