• In the case of Hill v Baxter 1958 1 QB 277, it was held that in order to avoid liability for reckless driving under the Road Traffic Act, one must prove automatism.
  • Intention is immaterial when considering reckless driving.

Facts of the Case

  • In this case, D drove a van across a road junction at high speed, ignoring an illuminated “halt” sign, and collided with a car.
  • The van continued a short distance before overturning.
  • In hospital later, D said that he could not recall what had happened.
  • On charges of dangerous driving contrary to s.11(1) of the Road Traffic Act, the only evidence for the defence as that of the D himself but, the prosecution having no objection, the justices allowed two reports from a doctor, who had examined D, to be put in.
  • These reports showed no abnormality and it was impossible to say whether D had had a “black out” or not.
  • D contended that he became unconscious because of being overcome by sudden illness.
  • The justices found that D must have exercised skill in driving in order to reach the road junction but where of the opinion that he was not conscious of what he was doing for some little time before reaching the junction and was not capable of forming any intention as to his manner of driving. They accordingly dropped the charges.

Issues in Hill v Baxter 1958 1 QB 277

  • Could it be proven that D had no formed intentions of driving recklessly?

Held by Court of Appeal

  • Held in favour of the prosecution.

Pearson J

  • The onus rested on the defence proving a state of automatism in which they failed.
  • Held that D’s intention was immaterial
  • “For the purpose of construing the word ” drive ” in section 11 one can have regard to the language of section 15 of the same Act. The opening words of section 15 before it was amended by the Road Traffic Act, 1956, were: ” A n y person who when ” driving or attempting to drive, or when in charge of, a motor ” vehicle on a road or other public place is under the influence ” of drink or a drug to such an extent as to be incapable of ” having proper control of the vehicle, shall be liable . . . ” In this case there is a clear finding that the respondent was driving and driving with skill. It is said in the case: ” The respondent ” intended to go to Withdean from Preston Circus, and he had ” made a substantial and unnecessary detour by driving into ” Springfield Boad. The respondent must have exercised skill ” in driving in order to reach Springfield Road from Preston ” Circus by whatever route he had taken.” The importance of the finding that he was driving with skill is the necessary implica­tion that he was controlling the car and directing its movements. Therefore, he was driving, and his driving was dangerous. The offence was committed and there is no evidence to support the acquittal. If in the material respect the burden of proof was on the prosecution, they discharged it by showing that the respondent was driving, and if the burden of proof was on the defence, they failed to prove an extraordinary mischance render­ ing it impossible for the respondent to control the car and direct its movements. I agree with the proposed order.
  • Appeal allowed” p.287

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