Page v Smith [1996] AC 155
Page v Smith is a leading case on psychiatric injury suffered by a primary victim. It holds that a claimant directly involved in an accident need not show that psychiatric harm itself was foreseeable if personal injury was reasonably foreseeable.
Facts
Mr Page was driving when his car collided with a vehicle driven negligently by Mr Smith. The impact was minor and caused no immediate physical injury. Mr Page had previously suffered from myalgic encephalomyelitis, commonly called chronic fatigue syndrome, but had been in remission. After the collision, his condition returned and became chronic, preventing him from working. The trial judge accepted that the accident caused the recurrence and awarded damages. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision because psychiatric injury was not reasonably foreseeable in a person of ordinary fortitude. Mr Page appealed, arguing that he was a primary victim directly involved in the collision and that the foreseeable risk of physical injury was sufficient.
Legal Issue
Must a primary victim directly involved in an accident prove that psychiatric injury was reasonably foreseeable, or is foreseeability of personal injury of some kind sufficient?
Held
By a majority, the House of Lords allowed Mr Page's appeal. He was a primary victim because he was directly involved in the collision and within the range of foreseeable physical injury. For such a claimant, it was enough that the defendant ought reasonably to have foreseen personal injury; the claimant did not also have to establish that psychiatric illness was foreseeable. Once a duty concerning personal injury existed, the defendant had to take the claimant as found, including any particular vulnerability. The control mechanisms developed for secondary victims, such as ordinary fortitude and close ties of love and affection, did not govern Mr Page's claim. The finding that the collision caused the recurrence of his condition therefore supported liability.
⭐ Legal Principle
Where a claimant is a primary victim of an accident and personal injury was reasonably foreseeable, recovery for a medically recognised psychiatric illness does not depend on separate foreseeability of psychiatric harm. The rule concerns those directly involved and endangered by the accident; secondary victims remain subject to distinct control mechanisms.
Significance
The decision draws the central distinction between primary and secondary victims in psychiatric-harm claims. It protects a directly endangered claimant's full personal injury, including an unexpectedly severe psychiatric response. The classification matters: Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police applies stricter controls to witnesses and relatives, while White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police rejected attempts to obtain primary-victim status without personal danger. Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust later explained that Page concerns an accident caused by the defendant which exposes the claimant to personal injury.
Common exam questions about this case
Why was Mr Page treated as a primary victim despite suffering no physical injury?
Primary-victim status did not depend on actual bodily injury. Mr Page was directly involved in the road accident and was within the range of foreseeable physical danger created by the defendant's driving. That distinguished him from a bystander who suffered psychiatric illness after witnessing injury to another person and would therefore face the secondary-victim controls.
What type of harm had to be foreseeable in Page v Smith?
For a primary victim on these facts, reasonable foreseeability of personal injury was enough. Mr Page did not have to prove that a psychiatric illness or recurrence of his particular condition was itself foreseeable. Once the duty concerning personal injury arose, the defendant bore responsibility for the form and extent of injury actually caused, subject to the ordinary requirements of causation.
Does Page v Smith remove the control mechanisms for secondary victims?
No. The decision distinguishes claimants directly involved in an accident from those who suffer psychiatric injury through witnessing harm to someone else. Secondary victims ordinarily must satisfy the Alcock controls, including close ties, proximity to the event or immediate aftermath, direct perception and a sudden shocking event. A claimant cannot avoid those requirements merely by describing psychiatric illness as foreseeable.