Tindall v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2024] UKSC 33

After losing control on black ice, Mr Kendall stood beside the road signalling motorists to slow down and called the emergency services. Police officers arrived about twenty minutes later, placed a 'Police Slow' sign and cleared debris. Mr Kendall then left in an ambulance. The officers removed their sign and departed without closing or treating the road. About thirty minutes later, Mr Bird skidded on the ice and collided with Mr Tindall's car; both men died. Mr Tindall's widow alleged that the police had displaced Mr Kendall's warning efforts and left road users worse off. For the strike-out application, it was assumed that Mr Kendall would otherwise have continued warning motorists, but it was not alleged that the officers knew or ought to have known of his earlier efforts.

Did the police make road users worse off by attending, removing their own warning sign and allegedly displacing Mr Kendall's protective action, so that an exception to the ordinary rule against liability for omissions applied?

The Supreme Court struck out the claim. The black ice was dangerous before the police arrived, and removing the officers' own sign merely restored the position that would have existed had they never attended. The pleaded interference argument also failed. Even assuming that Mr Kendall would otherwise have continued warning motorists, a duty on that basis required the police to know or ought to know that their conduct had put him off providing protection. The pleadings did not allege that necessary knowledge. Nor did merely taking control of the accident scene amount to an assumption of responsibility to road users. The officers may have responded ineffectually, but they had not made Mr Tindall worse off in the legally relevant sense.

Intervening in a dangerous situation does not create a duty merely because the defendant fails to improve it. Liability may arise if the defendant creates or increases the danger, or knows or ought to know that its intervention has displaced another person's protective action and leaves the claimant worse off. Mere control of an incident is insufficient.

The decision provides a structured explanation of the omissions principle after Michael and Robinson. It distinguishes making matters worse from failing to confer a benefit and rejects the idea that taking control of an incident automatically creates liability. Under the interference principle, the defendant must know or ought to know that its conduct has put another person off providing protection. The judgment matters for police and other public services, but its reasoning applies generally. Public bodies receive neither a special immunity nor a broader duty merely because they possess statutory powers.