Re Gulbenkian's Settlements [1970] AC 508
Re Gulbenkian's Settlements establishes the certainty test for a mere power of appointment. A power is valid if it can be said with certainty of any given person whether that person is or is not within the class of potential objects.
Facts
A settlement gave trustees a power to apply income for Nubar Gulbenkian, members of his family and a further class described by their personal or working relationship with him. The disputed words extended to people in whose home or company he might be residing, or by or with whom he might be employed. Those entitled in default challenged the power, arguing that its objects were too uncertain because a complete list of everyone who might satisfy this broad description could not be compiled. The House of Lords had to decide whether a mere power required complete enumeration of its objects and whether the language used supplied a sufficiently definite criterion for testing individual membership.
Legal Issue
What certainty of objects is required for a mere power, and was the broad description of people connected with Nubar Gulbenkian conceptually workable?
Held
The House of Lords held that the power was valid. A mere power does not require trustees or the court to compile a complete list of all possible objects. It is sufficient that the language supplies a criterion enabling the decision-maker to say of any given person that he or she is or is not within the class. Conceptual uncertainty in that criterion would be fatal, but evidential difficulty in proving an individual's circumstances does not necessarily invalidate the power. Their Lordships construed the disputed wording so that it had a workable meaning. Although trustees are not obliged to distribute under a mere power, holders of a fiduciary power must periodically consider whether and how it should be exercised.
⭐ Legal Principle
The objects of a mere power are sufficiently certain if the instrument provides a conceptually clear criterion by which any given individual can be classified as within or outside the class. A complete list is unnecessary. Evidential difficulty about a particular person's status is distinct from uncertainty in the meaning of the class description.
Significance
The decision replaced the complete-list approach for mere powers with the individual-postulant test and prepared the ground for McPhail v Doulton to apply a similar test to discretionary trusts. Re Baden (No 2) later exposed different judicial approaches to evidential uncertainty under that framework. Fixed trusts remain different because trustees must know every beneficiary in order to distribute fixed shares, so IRC v Broadway Cottages still requires a complete list in that context. The case also highlights that a fiduciary power is not simply ignored: trustees must consider its possible exercise even though they need not appoint property.
Common exam questions about this case
What certainty test did Re Gulbenkian's Settlements establish for mere powers?
The instrument must provide a clear criterion enabling the court or power holder to decide of any particular person whether that person falls within the class of objects. There is no need to identify every possible object in advance. The test therefore focuses on individual classification rather than a complete list, while still requiring the class description itself to be conceptually certain.
Why is evidential uncertainty different from conceptual uncertainty?
Conceptual uncertainty means the words used to define the class lack a clear meaning, so no reliable test of membership exists. Evidential uncertainty arises when the concept is clear but the facts about one claimant are difficult to prove. The former invalidates the power; the latter may simply mean that the individual cannot establish that he or she qualifies.
How does a mere power differ from a discretionary trust?
A donee of a mere power may choose whether to make an appointment, although a fiduciary power holder must properly consider the question. Trustees under a discretionary trust are under a duty to distribute according to the trust. Both now use a form of the is-or-is-not certainty test, but their obligations of survey, consideration and distribution are not identical.