R v Evans [2009] EWCA Crim 650

Gemma Evans bought heroin and supplied it to her sixteen-year-old half-sister, Carly. Carly voluntarily prepared and injected the drug. She then developed obvious symptoms of overdose, including extreme drowsiness and discolouration. Evans and her mother appreciated that Carly's condition was very serious, but they did not summon medical help because they feared getting into trouble. Carly died from heroin poisoning. Following R v Kennedy (No 2), Carly's voluntary self-injection meant that supplying the drug could not itself constitute unlawful-act manslaughter by causing the administration. Evans was instead convicted of gross negligence manslaughter based on her failure to obtain assistance after helping to create the dangerous situation. She appealed against the existence and scope of that duty.

Did Evans owe a duty to take reasonable steps to help after contributing to a dangerous situation and appreciating that her sister faced a life-threatening overdose?

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. A person who has created or contributed to a state of affairs that they know, or ought reasonably to know, has become life-threatening owes a duty to take reasonable steps to save the person at risk. The principle in R v Miller, concerning responsibility after creating a danger, was not confined to property offences or to the sole creator of the danger. Evans had procured and supplied the heroin, remained present, recognised the overdose and failed to seek help. The remaining requirements of gross negligence manslaughter still had to be proved: breach, causation, a serious and obvious risk of death, and negligence sufficiently gross to justify criminal liability.

Someone who creates or contributes to a dangerous state of affairs and becomes aware, or should become aware, that it threatens life has a duty to take reasonable steps to avert the danger. A gross breach causing death can support gross negligence manslaughter.

Evans is a leading authority on criminal liability for omissions following the creation of danger. It links Miller with gross negligence manslaughter while respecting Kennedy: the victim's voluntary injection prevented the supplier from being treated as causing administration for unlawful-act manslaughter, but it did not erase a later duty to respond to a known emergency. The case does not impose a general duty on every bystander or drug supplier. Liability depended on Evans's contribution to the danger, knowledge of the life-threatening condition, failure to take reasonable steps and satisfaction of all the demanding Adomako elements.