R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171
R v Adomako provides the modern foundation for gross negligence manslaughter. Civil negligence elements must be proved, together with negligence so serious that the jury is entitled to regard it as criminal.
Facts
Adomako was the anaesthetist during an eye operation. A tube in the anaesthetic equipment became disconnected, stopping the patient's oxygen supply. Adomako failed for several minutes to notice either the disconnection or obvious signs that the patient was not receiving oxygen. The patient suffered a cardiac arrest and later died from the resulting brain damage. Expert evidence described Adomako's failure to recognise and respond to the disconnection as exceptionally serious. He was convicted of gross negligence manslaughter. On appeal he argued that the offence had been inadequately defined and that the jury needed a more elaborate direction about recklessness or the degree of fault required.
Legal Issue
What elements establish gross negligence manslaughter, and how should a jury decide whether a negligent breach of duty is sufficiently serious to be criminal?
Held
The House of Lords dismissed the appeal. Lord Mackay LC held that the ordinary principles of negligence provide the framework. The prosecution must prove that the defendant owed the deceased a duty of care, breached it, and thereby caused death. The jury must then decide whether, having regard to the risk of death and all the circumstances, the breach was so gross as to justify criminal liability. The question is whether the conduct departed from the proper standard so seriously that it should be characterised as a crime deserving punishment, not merely as a matter for civil compensation. A separate Caldwell recklessness direction was unnecessary. On the evidence, Adomako's prolonged failure to notice the disconnected tube was capable of satisfying that high threshold.
⭐ Legal Principle
Gross negligence manslaughter requires a duty of care, breach, causation of death, a serious and obvious risk of death that was reasonably foreseeable at the time of breach, and negligence so exceptionally serious that the jury considers the conduct criminal. Ordinary carelessness or civil negligence alone is insufficient.
Significance
Adomako remains the leading authority for deaths caused by grossly negligent acts or omissions, including professional and workplace failures. Later Court of Appeal decisions make explicit that a serious and obvious risk of death must have been reasonably foreseeable at the time of breach; foresight of some injury is insufficient. The final assessment of grossness is for the jury under proper legal direction. The offence differs from unlawful-act manslaughter, which requires an objectively dangerous criminal act rather than breach of a duty of care.
Common exam questions about this case
What are the principal elements of gross negligence manslaughter?
The prosecution must establish a duty of care owed to the deceased, a breach of that duty, causation of death and a reasonably foreseeable risk of death. It must also prove that the breach was truly exceptionally bad in all the circumstances. The jury decides whether that negligence is gross enough to amount to a criminal offence rather than civil liability alone.
Must the defendant personally foresee death under Adomako?
Gross negligence manslaughter is not defined by subjective recklessness. The required risk of death is assessed objectively, asking whether it was reasonably foreseeable at the time of breach. Evidence of what the defendant actually knew may be highly relevant to grossness, but lack of personal appreciation does not automatically prevent liability where the dangerous breach was exceptionally serious.
Why was Adomako's conduct capable of being criminal rather than merely negligent?
An anaesthetist was responsible for maintaining the patient's oxygen supply, yet failed for a prolonged period to notice a disconnected tube and the patient's resulting condition. The omission exposed the patient to an obvious risk of death and caused the fatal injury. Expert evidence characterised the failure as extreme, allowing the jury to find a departure far beyond ordinary professional error.