Jackson v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56

The Hunting Act 2004 prohibited hunting wild mammals with dogs. It was enacted without the House of Lords' consent through the procedure in the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949. The claimants argued that the 1949 Act was invalid because it had itself been enacted using the 1911 Act. They characterised legislation made under the 1911 procedure as delegated legislation and contended that a delegated power could not lawfully enlarge itself. If the 1949 Act was invalid, the amended procedure used for the Hunting Act was unavailable. The challenge therefore required the appellate committee to examine the legal nature and scope of the Parliament Acts.

Was the Parliament Act 1949 validly enacted under the 1911 Act, and was the Hunting Act consequently valid primary legislation despite lacking the House of Lords' consent?

The House of Lords unanimously dismissed the challenge. Legislation enacted through the 1911 procedure is primary legislation, not delegated legislation, because it is made by the Queen and Commons under a redefined statutory process for Acts of Parliament. The power could be used to enact the 1949 Act, which reduced the delaying power of the Lords, and the Hunting Act was therefore valid. The express exclusion concerning extension of Parliament's maximum duration did not invalidate other amendments to the procedure. Several judges made wider observations suggesting that parliamentary sovereignty is a common-law construct and that extreme legislation attacking constitutional fundamentals might raise further questions. Those comments were obiter and did not qualify the binding decision.

Acts enacted in accordance with the Parliament Act 1911 procedure are primary legislation. The 1949 Act validly amended that procedure, so legislation satisfying the amended requirements has the same legal status as an Act passed with the House of Lords' consent.

Jackson is essential for understanding the legal mechanics of the Parliament Acts and the modern debate over parliamentary sovereignty. Its ratio confirms the validity of the 1949 Act and the Hunting Act. Statements by Lords Steyn, Hope and others about possible rule-of-law limits are constitutionally important but remain obiter, so they must not be presented as an established judicial power to invalidate primary legislation. The case can be compared with R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union and AXA General Insurance v Lord Advocate on constitutional statutes and institutional authority.