Curtis v Chemical Cleaning & Dyeing Co [1951] 1 KB 805

Mrs Curtis took a white satin wedding dress to the defendant cleaners. A shop assistant gave her a document headed “Receipt” and asked her to sign it. Mrs Curtis asked why a signature was necessary. The assistant explained that the cleaners would not accept responsibility for specified risks, including damage to beads and sequins. Relying on that explanation, Mrs Curtis signed. The printed condition was much wider: it purported to exclude the company's liability for any damage, however caused, and for delay. The dress was later returned with an unexplained stain. The county court found that the cleaners had been negligent and awarded Mrs Curtis £32 10s. The cleaners appealed, arguing that her signature incorporated the comprehensive exclusion clause and protected them from liability.

Could the cleaners rely on a broadly worded exclusion clause in a signed receipt when their assistant had innocently misrepresented the clause as applying only to specified risks?

The Court of Appeal dismissed the cleaners' appeal. Somervell LJ held that the assistant's explanation conveyed that the exclusion concerned only particular risks, whereas the document purported to exclude every form of damage. That false impression induced Mrs Curtis to sign, so the wider exemption did not become part of the contract. Denning LJ agreed that words or conduct may amount to misrepresentation where they mislead a party about the existence or extent of an exemption. The misrepresentation need not be fraudulent; an innocent but materially misleading explanation is enough to prevent the representor from relying on the wider clause. The usual signature rule in L'Estrange v Graucob therefore did not protect the cleaners.

A signature ordinarily binds a person to contractual terms in a document, whether or not they were read. That rule does not allow the proponent to rely on an exclusion whose existence or extent was misrepresented when the signature was obtained. An innocent statement or misleading conduct can suffice if it created the false impression that induced assent.

Curtis is an important exception to the signature principle in L'Estrange v Graucob and shows how incorporation and misrepresentation interact. It also complements Chapelton v Barry UDC, where a document presented as a receipt was not treated as contractual, and Olley v Marlborough Court, where notice came too late. Modern statutory controls may independently restrict exclusion clauses, but Curtis remains relevant at the prior stage of deciding whether the apparent assent covers the term on which a party relies.